The Reporter covers Miller, Morgan and Camden County in Central Missouri's Lake of the Ozarks and is published once per week on Wednesdays.
Published June 13, 2018
Judge’s ruling
(Editor’s note: The following is the judgment that was issued by Judge Brian C.
Wimes last week in its entirety).
The PDF version of this judgment is available by clicking this link Judge's ruling - Todd vs Hasty 6-6-2018
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
ROWLAND TODD,
Plaintiff,
v.
GREG HASTY, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 2:17-CV-04054-BCW
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #138). The
Court, being duly advised of the premises, grants said motion.
In this § 1983 action, Plaintiff Rowland Todd alleges he was retaliated against
in violation of his rights under the First Amendment. In February 2017, Todd
sent a letter to Defendants, County Commissioners of Camden County, Missouri,
criticizing their oversight of the county human resources department and use of
taxpayer money.
Todd’s claims are these: (I) first amendment retaliation based on Defendants’
2017 hostile work environment investigation; (II) first amendment retaliation
based on Defendant Greg Hasty’s media statement that Todd stole county records;
(III) first amendment retaliation based on the release of the Investigation
Report; (IV) first amendment retaliation based on the release of surveillance
video footage; (V) defamation against Defendant Hasty; and (VI) punitive
damages.
UNCONTROVERTED FACTS
Plaintiff Rowland Todd was the County Clerk of Camden County, and Defendants
Greg Hasty, Don Williams, and Beverly Thomas were Camden County Commissioners.
Defendant Hasty was Presiding Commissioner. Defendant Williams took office on
January 1, 2017, succeeding Cliff Luber.
The County Clerk’s Office was responsible for payroll and for responding to
Sunshine Law requests. Before 2015, the Clerk’s Office handled human resources.
In 2015, the Commission made HR a separate department from the Clerk’s Office.
Shortly thereafter, discussions began about possibly outsourcing payroll.
Beginning in March 2015, Brianna Christensen was the HR Director for Camden
County, making her an employee of the Commission. The HR department would
provide documentation to the Clerk’s Office to allow the Clerk’s Office to
perform payroll functions, including submission of retirement payments to CERF
and LAGERS, as well as for health insurance benefits. For example, when a county
employee was nearing retirement, HR would pull payroll records for the
employee’s two highest years of pay and complete a form, which the Clerk’s
Office would certify for CERF and LAGERS.
In late 2015, Plaintiff began complaining to Defendants that the Clerk’s Office
was not timely receiving paperwork from HR for the completion of payroll. The
payroll clerk also complained to Plaintiff about Christensen each week because
the payroll clerk could not get her work done without necessary documents from
HR.
On October 11, 2016, Christensen submitted a letter of resignation to
Defendants, citing a “hostile work environment created by 2nd District
Commissioner Cliff Luber, County Clerk Rowland Todd and his employees.”
Defendants made arrangements for Christensen to work parttime, and outside of
business hours to avoid dealing with Luber and/or Plaintiff and Clerk’s Office
employees.
When Christensen went to part-time, she asked that the payroll records, which
were usually stored in the Clerk’s Office, be brought to HR so that Christensen
could borrow them. The payroll records were in Christensen’s office beginning in
at least December 2016.
At some point, the payroll clerk wanted the records back in the Clerk’s Office.
She and others requested permission from Defendant Hasty to get the records from
the HR office. Defendant Hasty told the Clerk’s Office staff that they should
not got into the HR office unless Christensen was present. On two occasions,
Defendant Hasty told Christensen the Clerk’s Office wanted access to the records
in the HR office.
On January 19, 2017, Joyce Miller, a reporter from the Lake Sun, made a Sunshine
request for “any/all payroll records and/or expenditures paid as a contractor to
Brianna Christensen since January 1, 2016” and “any contract Camden County has
entered into with Christensen in 2016 or thus far in 2017.” Plaintiff fulfilled
the Sunshine request on January 23, 2017. Shortly thereafter, Defendant Hasty
called Plaintiff into his office and indicated he was not happy that Plaintiff
had given Miller all the requested documents.
On January 24, 2017, Christensen and the payroll clerk had a heated email
exchange in which the payroll clerk claimed Christensen’s attitude had changed
and Christensen claimed the Clerk’s Office had had a problem with Christensen
“since day one,” and Clerk’s Office employees were trying to get Christensen
fired.
On February 2, 2017, Defendants sent Plaintiff a letter seeking copies of the
information that Plaintiff had provided to Joyce Miller in response to her
Sunshine request. Plaintiff believed Defendants were reacting as though he had
done something wrong. Plaintiff asked Miller to return the records he had
provided to her. Since Miller returned the records, Plaintiff asked the county
attorney, Charles McElyea, whether he should still provide a copy of what he had
given Miller to Defendants. McElyea indicated that Plaintiff should still
respond to the request for copies of the documents provided. Plaintiff indicated
to McElyea that he would provide the requested documents to the Commission,
“with the understanding they drop it, if they don’t then its personal.”
Thereafter, Plaintiff provided copies of the documents to Defendants, but
continued to feel as though Defendants were attacking him.
On February 6, 2017, a CERF representative emailed the Plaintiff and Clerk’s
Office staff, indicating that employee information for 2016 needed to be
submitted by a certain date in order for matching funds to be paid on all
eligible employee retirement plans. Consequently, Plaintiff became concerned
that HR, and specifically Christensen, would not process the CERF paperwork
before the CERF submission deadline, which would result in retirees not getting
employee matching funds for each of their service years. Notwithstanding,
Plaintiff did not act on this concern.
One Friday evening, Christensen was working in the HR office when she noticed
that a box of payroll records she needed was missing. The box of records was not
located the next week, and Christensen suspected that the records were in the
Clerk’s Office. She told her assistant to ask the Clerk’s Office for the box of
records. On February 7, 2017, Christensen’s assistant asked the Clerk’s Office
for the records, and Plaintiff returned the box to HR.
Defendant Hasty asked the maintenance supervisor, Melvin Miller, for
surveillance footage because he wanted to track the box of payroll records. The
surveillance video showed that around January 24, 2017, Plaintiff went into the
HR office when Christensen was not there, removed the box of records, brought
the box the Clerk’s Office, and locked the box in a file cabinet. The video
shows that the box was not removed from the file cabinet for two weeks, until
Christensen’s assistant asked that the payroll records be returned the HR
office.
On February 10, 2017, a county employee texted Defendant Thomas, asking whether
there was a problem with the CERF matching because the employee had heard a
rumor that CERF was going to “drop” Camden County. The county employee knew
about the CERF email because she had requested a copy of it from Plaintiff, who
had provided it to her.
On February 21, 2017, Plaintiff gave Defendants a letter, expressing Plaintiff’s
opinion and concerns relating to Defendants’ oversight of the county human
resources department. Plaintiff’s letter mentioned waste of taxpayer dollars and
adverse impact on county efficiency. The letter says, in part, “I am writing to
you as a citizen of the County and as Clerk, as my concern affects me and the
taxpayers and citizens of this county.” The letter was on Plaintiff’s official
letterhead, and is signed by Plaintiff as the county Clerk. The letter states
that in 2015, the Commission decided to create a separate HR department,
removing all HR duties from the purview of the Clerk’s Office, except for
payroll. The letter stated that HR was failing to perform its paperwork,
preventing the Clerk’s Office staff from performing payroll duties. The letter
also stated that HR’s failure to timely process required documents created the
need to outsource payroll, which wastes taxpayer money, since processing and
payroll were previously completed solely by the Clerk’s Office. Plaintiff did
not think the plan to outsource payroll was attributable to any lag in document
processing by HR.
Plaintiff was not hoping that Defendants would respond publicly to the letter.
Plaintiff would have provided a copy of his letter through Sunshine request if
someone had asked for it, but he would not have shared the letter externally
otherwise.
On February 23, 2017, the sentiments expressed in Plaintiff’s letter were
published in an article written by Miller in the Lake Sun news.
On February 28, 2017, Defendants hired two attorneys from Husch Blackwell, LLC
to investigate Christensen’s October claims of a hostile work environment and
the allegations in Plaintiff’s letter. In the course of their investigation,
Plaintiff met with the attorneys, and had the opportunity to provide his side of
the story.
The same day that the investigation was launched, the Lake Sun published an
article by Miller that included statements from Plaintiff that the investigation
was in retaliation for the letter.
On March 1, 2017, the Lake Expo published an article quoting Defendant Hasty
stating: “[w]e have evidence to show, by film, that Plaintiff stole records out
of [Christensen’s] office to stop her from being able to do her job.”
On March 2, 2017, Plaintiff met with Defendant Williams and the new HR
administrator to work things out between payroll and HR. Plaintiff wanted
Defendant Williams to “get Christensen to take care of her job” because the
Clerk’s Office “couldn’t do [theirs] without her doing hers.”
On March 17, 2017, the Investigation Report was released publicly, based on the
investigating attorneys’ recommendation. Defendants were advised not to read or
review the report before its release, and they did not. The Investigation Report
ultimately concluded there was no hostile work environment that could predicate
a viable claim for employment discrimination against Camden County. The
Investigation Report also concluded there was insufficient evidence to support a
finding that Plaintiff committed a crime, failed to perform duties as the county
Clerk, or violated any privacy laws by responding to the Sunshine request for
Christensen’s payroll records.
Plaintiff plans to run for re-election as County Clerk in 2018. Plaintiff’s
claims against
Defendants are not alleged against Camden County.
LEGAL STANDARD
A party is entitled to summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56; Rafos v. Outboard Marine Corp., 1 F.3d 707, 708 (8th Cir. 1993)
(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322- 23 (1986)). The moving
party bears the burden to establish both the lack of any genuine issue of
material fact and an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477
U.S. at 323. In applying this burden, the Court affords to the non-moving party
the benefit of all reasonable factual inferences. Mirax Chem. Prods. Corp. v.
First Interstate Commercial Corp., 950 F.2d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1991)).
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue there is no genuine issue of material fact and they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of Plaintiff’s claims. First,
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff does
not allege claims against them in their individual capacities, and the complaint
does not allege facts that could give rise to liability against Defendants in
their official capacities. Second, Defendants argue they are entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims based on the
predicate facts in Counts I, II, III, and IV. Third, Defendant Hasty asserts he
is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim of defamation.
As an initial matter, the Court notes the Eighth Circuit requirement that a
plaintiff who intends to seek damages against a government official in his or
her official and individual capacities must include in the complaint a “clear
statement” of that intent. Remington v. Hoopes, 611 Fed. App’x 883, 885 (8th
Cir. 2015) (citing Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 341 (8th Cir. 1989) (“[S]ection
1983 litigants wishing to sue government agents in both capacities should simply
use the following language: ‘Plaintiff sues each and all defendants in both
their individual and official capacities’”)). While, in this case, Plaintiff’s
second amended complaint does not include this language, Plaintiff’s motion for
leave to amend does seek to file a third amended complaint, which, as proposed,
includes the requisite clear statement of Plaintiff’s intent to pursue both
official and individual capacity claims against Defendants. Although Plaintiff’s
motion for leave to amend was filed after Defendants filed the motion for
summary judgment, Defendants’ motion asserts a right to judgment to the extent
Plaintiff alleges both official capacity and individual capacities claims. In
light of the conclusions below, and in reliance on the general “judicial
preference for adjudication on the merits,” it would be the Court’s intent to
grant Plaintiff leave to file the proposed third amended complaint. Oberstar v.
F.D.I.C., 987 F.2d 494, 504 (8th Cir. 1993). The Court thus considers the merits
of Defendants’ summary judgment motion.
A. THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S OFFICIAL CAPACITY
CLAIMS IS GRANTED.
Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment because there is no
genuine issue of material fact that Camden County is not liable for Plaintiff’s
claims as a matter of law. Defendants argue the complaint does not include
allegations to establish liability against the county under Monell v. Department
of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Plaintiff’s
opposition brief does not contradict Defendants assertions.
Claims against government officials in “official-capacity suits . . . generally
represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an
officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). “[A]
judgment against a public servant in his official capacity imposes liability on
the entity that he represents . . . .” Id. (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S.
464, 471 (1985)). “Section 1983 liability for a constitutional violation may
attach to a municipality if the violation resulted from (1) an official
municipal policy, (2) and unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent
failure to train or supervise.” Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, Mo., 709 F.3d
1201, 1214 (8th Cir. 2013).
Under the uncontroverted facts of this case, Camden County is not a party to
this suit. Therefore, the county is liable only if Plaintiff establishes
liability against the individual Commissioners in their official capacities.
Both the second amended complaint and proposed third amended complaint allege
that county policy required investigations into employee complaints not be
disclosed to the public, and Defendants acted contrary to that policy. Even with
all reasonable inferences drawn in Plaintiff’s favor, deviation from an
established policy does not give rise to entity liability because a deviation
from policy does not equate to an official policy. Bolderson v. City of
Wentzville, Mo., 840 F.3d 982, 986 (8th Cir. 2016). Further, a single instance
does not constitute a custom. Id. Finally, Plaintiff does not allege facts to
establish liability against the county based on deliberate indifference or
failure to train. Consequently, there is no genuine issue of material fact and
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law to the extent Plaintiff
alleges claims against them in their official capacities, and/or against Camden
County. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s official capacity
claims is granted.
B. THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDMENT
RETALIATION CLAIMS IS GRANTED.
Defendants argue there is no genuine issue of material fact and they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s claims for First
Amendment retaliation alleged in Counts I, II, III, and IV. Plaintiff’s Count I
is predicated on Defendant Hasty’s public statements that Plaintiff was being
investigated related to Christensen’s claims of a hostile work environment.
Plaintiff’s Count II is predicated on Defendant Hasty’s public statements that
Plaintiff “stole records.” Count III is predicated on the publication of the
Investigation Report. Count IV is predicated on the publication of the
surveillance video of Plaintiff removing the payroll records from HR. Plaintiff
argues that Defendants’ conduct described in Counts I through IV was in
retaliation for the letter Plaintiff gave to Defendants on February 21, 2017.
To succeed on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a public employee plaintiff
must show: (1) he engaged in protected speech, that is, speech on matter of
public concern; (2) his interest as a citizen in commenting on the issue
outweighs the public employer’s interest in promoting efficient public service;
and (3) his speech was a motivating factor in the action taken against him.
Bailey v. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 451 F.3d 514, 522 n.2 (8th Cir.
2006) (citing Howard v. Columbia Pub. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir.
2004)).
1. The expressions is Plaintiff’s letter are not protected speech.
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff’s
expressions in the letter are not protected speech because Plaintiff was
speaking as a public official. Plaintiff counters that he engaged in
constitutionally-protected activity when he criticized the Defendants’ oversight
of HR and use of taxpayer funds.
“The First Amendment limits the ability of a public employer to leverage the
employment relationship to restrict, incidentally or intentionally, the
liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private citizens.” Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006). In addition, however, “[w]hen a citizen
enters government service, the citizen by necessity must accept certain
limitations on his or her freedom.” Id. (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S.
661, 671 (8th Cir. 1994)).
“A public employee retains a degree of First Amendment protection when [he or]
she speaks as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.” Bonn v. City of
Omaha, 623 F.3d 587, 592 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417). “So
long as employees are speaking as citizens about matters of public concern, they
must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for their employers
to operate efficiently and effectively.” Bailey v. Dep’t of Elementary &
Secondary Educ., 451 F.3d 514, 518 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at
418).
By contrast, however, if the speech at issue is beyond the scope of “speak[ing]
as a citizen addressing matters of public concern,” “then the employee has no
First Amendment cause of action based on his or her employer’s reaction to the
speech.” Id. “In particular, ‘when public employees make statements pursuant to
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications
from employer discipline.’” Id.
Two questions “guide interpretation of the constitutional protections accorded
to public employee speech.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. First, the Court must
determine whether “the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public
concern.” Id. (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205,
Will Cty., 391 U.S. 563, 586 (1968)). “If the answer is no, the employee has no
First Amendment cause of action based on his or her employer’s reaction to the
speech.” Id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)). “If the answer
is yes, then the possibility of a First Amendment claim arises,” and the Court
must determine, second, whether the public employer “had an adequate
justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the
general public.” Garcetti, 547 at 418 (citing Pickering, 381 U.S. at 568).
“These questions are matters of law for the court to resolve.” Kincade v. City
of Blue Springs, Mo., 64 F.3d 389, 395 (8th Cir. 1995).
The Court thus must first determine whether Plaintiff was speaking as a citizen
on a matter of public concern in the letter. “An employee’s speech touches upon
a matter of public concern when it is a matter of political, social, or other
concern to the community at large.” Kincade, 64 F.3d at 396 (internal quotations
omitted). Whether the speech touches a matter of public concern requires
examination of the speech’s “content, form, and context . . . given the record
as a whole,” focused on the role of the employee. Kincade, 64 F.3d at 396
(citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 146); Bailey, 451 F.3d at 518. “If the speech was
mostly intended to further the employee’s private interests rather than to raise
issues of public concern, [the] speech is not protected, even if the public
might have an interest in the topic of [the] speech.” Bailey, 451 F.3d at 518
(citing Schilcher v. Univ. of Ark., 387 F.3d 959, 963 (8th Cir. 2004)).
In this case, Plaintiff’s letter was on official county letterhead, and stated
he was writing about concerns both as a citizen of the county, and as Clerk.
Plaintiff’s letter posits that the removal of HR duties from the Clerk’s Office
has resulted in waste of tax dollars, inefficiency, and harm to County
employees. The letter states explicitly, “[t]he issues expressed to you are
matters of public concern adversely affecting the citizens of our county.” (Doc.
#1-1). Finally, the letter is signed by Plaintiff as the Camden County Clerk.
Generally, speech relating to the use of public funds touches upon a matter of
public concern. Kincade, 64 F.3d at 396. Additionally, speech that criticizes an
official’s discharge of duties also touches a matter of public concern. Belk v.
City of Eldon, 228 F.3d 872, 878 (8th Cir. 2000). Notwithstanding these
generalities, and notwithstanding Plaintiff’s assertion that the letter was
written in his capacity as a citizen, the letter is protected speech only if the
statements in it were not made pursuant to Plaintiff’s official duties as County
Clerk.
“Speech is pursuant to an employee’s duties if it is “part-and-parcel of” the
employee’s concerns about his ability to properly execute his duties.” Lyons v.
Vaught, 875 F.3d 1168, 1174 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted).
“[S]peech can be pursuant to a public employee’s official job duties even though
it is not required by, or included in, the employee’s job description, or in
response to a request by the employer.” Id. (citing Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ.,
593 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 2010). “A public employee’s speech is not protected
by the First Amendment if it owes its existence to his professional
responsibilities.” McGee v. Pub. Water Supply, 471 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir.
2006).
Such is the case with respect to Plaintiff’s letter. The concerns expressed in
Plaintiff’s letter arise from Plaintiff’s role as Clerk, and his inside
knowledge of the internal county office functions. The letter discusses the
Clerk’s role in discharging its duty to supervise county payroll, and the
obstacles presented by the introduction of the separate HR office. The concerns
and criticisms raised point to HR’s interference with the Clerk’s efficient
discharge of official duties. Moreover, under the uncontroverted facts, the
letter reflects the same concerns about HR that Plaintiff expressed to
Defendants in the time leading up to February 2017. Additionally, Plaintiff said
he would have provided a copy of his letter in response to a Sunshine request,
which suggests Plaintiff considered the letter to be subject to public
disclosure as an official county document. Therefore, the Court concludes the
letter owed its existence to Plaintiff’s official role as the Camden County
Clerk.
Even if the letter includes matters of public concern, as well as matters of
personal interest relating to Plaintiff’s official role as Clerk, the content,
form, and context of letter establishes that Plaintiff was acting primarily as
an employee. Bailey, 451 F.3d 15 518. Because the record establishes that the
letter was mostly intended to further Plaintiff’s interests in his ability to
fulfill his role as Clerk, the concerns expressed in the letter are not
protected speech, even if the public may have a general interest in the concerns
presented. Id. For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s
letter does not amount to speech from Plaintiff as a citizen speaking on a
matter of public concern. Because there is no genuine issue material that the
letter is not speech from a citizen on a matter of public concern, Plaintiff
does not have a viable First Amended cause of action based on Defendants’
reactions to the letter as a matter of law. The Court’s analysis of Counts I
through IV need not proceed further, and Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for First Amendment retaliation.
C. THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S DEFAMATION CLAIM IS
GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s Count V alleges a claim of defamation against Defendant Hasty based
on a statement to the media that Plaintiff stole county records. Defendant Hasty
argues there is no genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiff cannot
establish actual malice, such that Defendant Hasty is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Plaintiff counters that genuine issues of material fact preclude
summary judgment for Defendant Hasty on Count V.
The Court should grant the motion for summary judgment if there is no genuine
issue of material fact and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law with respect to each of the following elements: (1) publication; (2) of a
defamatory statement; (3) that identifies Plaintiff; (4) that is false; (5) that
is published with the requisite degree of fault; and (5) damage to Plaintiff’s
reputation. Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62, 70 (Mo. 2000)
(citing Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. 1992). With respect to
the element of the degree of fault, “where a public figure is the subject of the
defamatory publication, then under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), proof of actual malice is required even
for liability of actual damages.” Englezos v. The Newspress & Gazette Co., 980
S.W.2d 25, 30 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). A defamatory statement is considered made
with actual malice if it was made “with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727, 728 (1968). Further, recovery of the punitive damages sought in Count
VI requires clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. Id. (citing Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974)).
Under the uncontroverted facts and with factual inferences drawn in Plaintiff’s
favor, Plaintiff has established that Defendant Hasty made statements to the
media that Plaintiff had stolen payroll records, which is untrue. Ribaudo v.
Bauer, 982 S.W.2d 701, 705 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (“A charge of criminal conduct is
generally not a statement of an opinion, but rather an assertion of fact.”).
However, the First Amendment protects false statements, “except the knowing or
reckless falsehood.” In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829, 846 (1991).
[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would
have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with
such doubts shows reckless disregard for the truth or falsity and demonstrates
actual malice. Id. (citing St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731).
In this case, at issue is Defendant Hasty’s March 2017 statement to the Lake
Expo that the County had video evidence that depicted Plaintiff removing records
from the HR office, “to stop [Christensen] from doing her job.” At the time of
this statement, the investigation of Christensen’s hostile work environment
claim and the allegations in Plaintiff’s letter to Defendants was ongoing. The
Investigation Report, concluding that there was insufficient evidence to find
that Plaintiff had committed a crime, was released to the public on March 17,
2017. Under the uncontroverted facts, Defendants did not read the Investigation
Report until after it was publicly released. These facts give rise to the
factual inference that Defendant Hasty did not know definitively that the
evidence did not support that Plaintiff had stolen records until after he made
the subject statement to the Lake Expo. While possible that Defendant Hasty was
aware of the investigative findings while the investigation was ongoing,
Plaintiff has not adduced evidence to give rise to the factual inference that
Defendant Hasty knew that evidence did not support the implication that
Plaintiff had stolen records. To the contrary, the statement at issue indicates
the true statement that the County had video evidence of Plaintiff removing
records from HR. Defendant Hasty’s assertion that Plaintiff removed the records
to prevent Christensen from doing her job was based on Defendant Hasty’s
perception of the circumstances overall, even though that perception was not
confirmed by the Investigation Report. The Court thus concludes that, based on
the record, at the time Defendant Hasty made the subject statement, he did not
have serious doubt as to the statement’s truth. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 730-31.
Although the issue of malice is generally a question for the jury, the
uncontroverted facts of this case do not give rise to the inference that
Defendant Hasty’s statements were made with reckless disregard for the truth.
Estes v. Lawton-Byrne-Bruner Ins. Agency Co., 437 S.W.2d 685, 691 (Mo. Ct. App.
1969). Therefore, Defendant Hasty is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
defamation claim.
Because the conclusions above are dispositive of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court
declines to undertake analysis of the other issues raised by Defendants’ motion.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #138) is GRANTED.
I
T IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: June 6, 2018
/s/ Brian C. Wimes
JUDGE BRIAN C. WIMES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
All content is Copyright 2018 by Reporter Publishing, L.L.C. Unauthorized reproduction is prohibited without written permission.